Commentary / Skinner: Phylogeny and ontogeny dates ofthese books were 1972-19H:3; I set a criterion of at least five years after publication of "Phylogeny" for a tex t to be included. While two-thirds (14) cited at least onc of his writings , only five cited "Phylogeny," ' not all of them favorably. (The five were Denny 1980; Eihl-Eibesfeldt 1975; Mortenson 1975; Nevin & Reynolds 1973; and Wilson 1975). The most frequent point made is that there is a parallel between individual behavior change and the evolution ofhehavioJ". This comparison is not at all new, having been made, perhaps most presciently , by E. L. Thorndike (IOOOa; 1900b), the founder of American animal learning psychology, in his astute 1899 lectures on instinct and learning at Woods Hole that followed a previous series of lectures hy C . O. Whitman (1899), whom Lorenz and other ethologists hold to be the founder of comparative ethology (Burghardt 1973).
learning psychology, in his astute 1899 lectures on instinct and learning at Woods Hole that followed a previous series of lectures hy C . O. Whitman (1899), whom Lorenz and other ethologists hold to be the founder of comparative ethology (Burghardt 1973) .
Ethologists have frequently argued that the field of animal learning has left out comparativc, ecological , and evolutionary considerations in its rush to formulate general principles. A push for this impatiencc certainly arose from a primary interest in human learning and the dcsire to use controlled "scientific" studies with animals to lcgitimize applications to pcople. Certainly the power and successes ofbchavior modification principles in diverse areas of human hehavior are a lasting tribute to Skinner. Yet even thesc successes have been most marked when a relatively eclectic approach is taken with respect to the behaviors recorded and the contex ts employed. This is in marked contrast to the animal operant conditioning work which, with few exceptions, has continued to foc us not only on rat lever pressing and pigeon pecking hut has become insular, extremely esoteric, and removed from most of the concerns and issues of other students of animal behavior.
Indeed today, as behavioral ecology formulates models that cry out for the operant methodology, people other than traditional Skinnerians have had to examine the parallels and applications (e.g. Crawford 1983). I personally find extremely stimulating work such as Timherlake's (1983) which tries to apply a knowledge of the principles of animal learning and the evolved behavioral repertoires of their subjects in a way that makes me think a true integration of ontogeny and phylogeny, ethology and experimental psychology, just might be possible. Skinner's contribution to the study of animal behavior will endure; context and style have slowed, hut not prevented, their incorporation into ethology.
Operant conditioning and natural selection
Andrew M. Colman
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Who says Skinner has no sense of humor? In "Phylogeny" he tells us that fishermen do not set nets because of any internal intention, purpose, or desire to catch fish. They do so merely because their net-setting hehavior has been reinforced in the past and has therefore become more frequent, just as spiders do not spin webs because of any intention, purpose, or desire to catch flies, but merely hecause their web-spinning behavior has been naturally selected in the past and has therefore become more frequent. "Even if wc could discover a spider's felt intention or sense of purpose," says Skinner, "wc could not offer it as a cause of the behavior"; presumably the fisherman's felt intention , which wc can easily discover, is equally irrelevant to the explanation of his hehavior, or can supply only a "fictional explanation" (Skinner 19.53, p . 278) .
Variations on this familiar theme can he found throughout Skinner's writings over the past half-century. Is he willing to confirm, after all these years, with the tide of cognitive psycho 1-
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THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1984) 74 ogy running high , that he nevcr intended these statcments to Ill' taken literally? If not, then will he certih the fi)IJowing heha\-ioral analyses , which suggest (as Blanshard 1967 and others have pointed out) that novelists , dramatists , historians, philosophers, and ordinary people the world over have hecn governed by a unanimous illusion? (a) Romeo's feeling oflove for J ulict, and his mistaken belief that she was dead, were in no sense causes of his suicide; his suicide can he explained only as thc result of external influences which somehow increased the frequency of his suicidal response from zero to one. (b) Hitler's feeling of hatred toward the Jews is irrelevant in explaining his genocidal policies; the Final Solution must he attributed to contingencies of reinforcement which increased the frequency of his genocidal behavior. (c) Skinner does not propound this doctrine hecause he believes it to be true; he propounds it (frequently) merely because he has been reinforced in the past for doing so. This last example suggests, by the way, that Skinner's behaviorism is a self-defeating doctrine, since whenever he propounds it he implicitly denies that he believes it , or at least that it has any valid claim to truth (sce Branden 1963; Locke 1966) .
In "Phylogeny" Skinne r draws an analogy be tween ope-rant conditioning and natural selection in the provenance of behavior. A certain response is more likely to recur if it is associated with ontogenic contingencies that are reinforCing, just as a different response may be more likely to recur if it is associated with phylogenic contingencies that favor it through natural selection. I have always felt suspicious of this analogy, and I now think I have put my finger on onc cardinal deficiency of operant conditioning theory in comparison with the theory of natural selection. Operant conditioning theory offers no mechanism to explain changes ill respollse frequen cy. In the (modern) theory of natural selection, responses heeom e more frequent because, when exposed to certain phylogenic con tingencies, organisms that possess genes for these responses prod uce more offspring, on average, than do other organisms that lack such genes, and these offspring tend to resemble their parents because they inherit their parents' genes . In the theory of operant conditioning, on the other hand , responses become more frequent when organisms arc exposed to certain ontogenic contingencies of reinforcement, but no mechanism is offered to account for this. In fact , the events that function as reinforcers are defined simply as those that increase the frequency of the responses they follow: "the only defining characteristic of a reinforcing stimulus is that it reinforces" (Skinner 1953, p. 72) ; the theory does not presume to explain how or why response frequency increases. Operant theory, in sharp contrast to natural selection theory, purports to he merely descriptive rather than explanatory (see, e. g., Skinner 1938, p. 44; 1950) , and therein lies onc of its crucial weaknesses.
But in spite of its purportedly atheoretical character, operant theory does entail claims that can, at least in principle, he empirically falsified. For example, in "Phylogeny" Skinner asserts that "what wc may call the ontogeny of be ha vi or [can bel traced to contingencies of reinforcement ." Mills (1978a; 1978h) has raised several objections to this assertion, but I shall confine my remarks to just onc, which arises from experiments on autoshaping. Brown and Jenkins (1968) demonstrated that the key-peck response in pigeons develops when the key in a Skinner box is illuminated, even when the pecking does not speed up the delivery of food reinforcements . WilIiams and Williams (1969) showed that the ontogeny of this kind of be ha vior cannot be traced to any accidental or adventitious reinforcement. More recently, Stiers and Silherberg (1974) found that, although rats will not learn to press a bar if there is a random relationship between the presentation of the (retractable) bar and food reinforcement, they will do so if there is a predictable relationship, even when bar pressing delays the delivery of food reinforcement.
Skinner has recently gone on record as saying: "I do not often read my critics" (Skinner 1983h, p. 28) . Since he willundouhtedly read this commentary, and the othcrs in this issuc , I only hopc that I shall he ablc to undcrstand his rcsponsc. When, about 15 years ago, I had to prepare a lecturc intended to inform a conference of neuroscientists about the views of cthologists on the development of behavior, I thought it would bc a good idea to contrast these views with those ofbehaviorists. One of the themes I thought of featuring was thc behaviorists' Olympian disregard of biological evolution. The title of the lecture was going to be 'The Phylogeny of Behavior Ontogeny." My dismay was great when idly leafing through a pile of Science issues left by my office predecessor I stumbled upon B. F . Skinner's "Phylogeny, " There was the precminent theoretician of be ha vi oris m holding forth on the very topic I supposed he and his brethren chose to ignore. I quickly modified both thc tack and the title of my presentation (Delius 1970) . However, as laudable as I found Skinner's late interest in evolution, I was disappointed by "Phylogeny. " It was neither a source of theoretical inspiration nor a reflection of the state of the art. On the contrary, it seemed intent on reversing hardwon progress. It reified in the guise of "ontogenic hehavior" and "phylogenic behavior" the strict dichotomy between innate and learned behavior, a division that even ethological diehards had by then heen forced to give up . All the arguments and thc evidence against such a black-or-white distinction that had been marshaled by then (sec Hinde 1966; Marler & Hamilton 1966) seemed to have bypassed Skinner. A rigid commitment leads him to equate behavioral ontogeny exclusively with the changes of response probabilities due to reinforceme nt contingencies, that is, with opcrant conditioning. Not even classical conditioning is expressly acknowlcdged to play a role in the developmcnt of be ha vi or. Imprinting is, summarily and wrongly, dismissed as just another instance of operant conditioning. Nonlearning influences of environmcntal variahles on the ontogeny of he ha vior are ignored. The provenance of "ontogenic behavior" is simply and purely operant conditioning and nothing elsc.
Consequence contingencies and provenance partitions
In contrast, Skinner ascribes the provenance of "phylogenic behavior" to the contingencies of natural selection acting upon a collection of fixed action pattcrns and does not allow it any ontogeny. This is logically consistent within his conceptual framework but ignores the fact that it conflicts with the evidence then already extant. That phylogeny exerts control over behavior via ontogeny and through genes is conveniently ignored. Behavior gene tics is all but dismissed on the technical ground that its res ults do not square with Skinner's expcctation that genes should cxprcss themselves in "units" of behavior.
Conversely, "ontogenic behavior" apparently does not have a phylogeny except that Skinner admits obliquely that baseline responding and certain reinforeers may have an evolutionary provenance. Considering that Skinner equates ontogeny with operant conditioning, that might be a fair reflection of contemporary behaviorist opinion. But there were already signs that it would not endure (Garcia & Koelling 1966) . Following earlier ethological suggestions (Lorenz 1965; Tinbergen 1951) it soon became apparent that the phylogeny of learning is a more complex and incisive issue (Seligman 1970) .
Instead, attention is drawn to the analogy that exists betwcen the processes underlying phylogeny and ontogeny (sensu Skinner). Contingencies of selection in onc case and contingencies of Commentary / Skinner: Phylogeny and ontogeny reinforcement in the other are identilled as the moving agcnts. This parallel still has some reality, but it would have lwcn fair to point out that other authors , lIlore reccnt than Dcscartes, had dealt with it in some detail (e.g. Pringle 1951). The <:omparisoll of the outcomes of schedules of reinforcement with the effect of schedules of selection that might have heen illuminating remains superficial; Skinner, perhaps sensing that it would have shown up the limitations of the analogy, chose not to find out what evolutionary hiologists had to say ahout the matter. The exciting possibility of an "experimental analysis of phylogenic behavior" is surprisingly negated by alluding to natural selection's action in the unrecoverable past. Artificial selection is unnatural and thus deemed not really relevant. Ad hoc pleading is then necessary to immunize from a similar criticism artificial reinforcement, the hasis of what should now correctly he the "experimental analysis of ontogenic behavior." Arguahly, the failure to provide objective, as opposed to hypothetical, accounts of the natural ontogeny of behaviors as a product of natural reinforcement contingencies was already in 1966 corroding the attractiveness of radical behaviorism.
Why has the paper had so little impact, even among Skinner's own following? It is simply that the attempt to contain the explosion of knowledge that had in the meantime occurred within the very lean ontological framework conceived some 30 years earlier (Skinner 1938) yielded an inadequately narrow account. It could not compete against the up and coming eclectic, much richer, multidisciplinary account of hehavior (Delius 1985) , which, to he sure, incorporates a great deal of what Skinner and his disciples have discovered and described with truly admirahle acumen. The sad fact is that simplicity, contrary to widespread opinion, is not a principle that organisms often care to respeet. Skinner complains that explanatory entities such as "instincts," "drives," and "traits" still survive. But evidently he fails to realize that these eoncepts have heen redefined and in most cases replaced. "Phylogenetically adapted," for example, is preferred to "instinctive" nowadays. The term refers to the source of information controlling the process of differentiation during embryogenesis and ontogeny. If, for example, motor patterns develop without corresponding patterned input from the environment then it is reasonable to assume that the wiring of the neuronal networks underlying these skills developed in a process of self-differentiation according to the developmental recipes encoded in the genome of the individual in question . To argue that some unidentified environmental faetors might have contributed to the patterning comes close to referring to some mystical force. Those poor mice whose fijrelimbs were amputated by Fentress (1973) at birth and which nonetheless developed the complete coordinated pattern of preening the head with the (nonexisting) forelimbs -as could he deduced from the movement of the stumps, the contraction of the re maining muscles, and the head and eye movements coordinated to the movement patterns of the "arms" -could not possihly have learned by any of the traditional ways ofiearning. All the details THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1984) 74
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